신뢰/기밀 컴퓨팅 개요

CySecLab (Cyber Systems Security Research Lab)

강병훈 Brent ByungHoon Kang, Ph.D.,

May 27, 2021



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Intro. to Confidential Computing in the Age of Al

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인공지능 기반 응용 서비스의 기초 요소들



이미지, 얼굴, 언어, 음성





판단/연관/유추 의료 진단, 악성코드공격 판별, 상품 제안





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범죄방어, 금융시장, 의료 예측







개인정보 데이터에 기반한 인공지능 서비스



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인공지능 기반 어플리케이션 및 서비스 시스템







Applications and Platform Systems





Vulnerable Applications and Malwares







Vulnerable Applications, Systems and Malwares





Vulnerable Applications, Systems and Malwares

<<궁극의 질문 1.>> 악성코드 없는 세상이 가능할까 ?





Platform System Integrity Monitor



http://breakthroughs.kaist.ac.kr/?post_no=163

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- 삼성 스마트 TV 보안 시스템(GAIA)에 연구
 결과 적용 및 탑재
- 삼성 사업부 소프트웨어 보안 솔루션에
 Anti-Emulation 탐지 방어기능(2018년),

힙 취약점 공격 방어기술(2017년)







Vulnerable Applications, Systems and Malwares









Secure Isolation of Application





Secure Isolation of Application







Data-at-Rest Protection





Data-in-Transit Protection



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Data-in-Use Protection







Data-in-Use Protection: Confidential Computing







Trusted Confidential Computing (신뢰 기밀 컴퓨팅)







TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) 하드웨어 아키텍처

External hardware security module

- Example: TPM, SIM card or a Smart card
- Advantages
 - ✔ High level of tamper resistance and physical security
- Disadvantages
 - ✔ Power efficiency and performance of the device
 - ✔ Reliant to the less secure software outside of the smartcard
 - ✓ Providing a smart card alongside with the main SoC is expensive







TEE 하드웨어 아키텍처

Internal hardware security module

- Example
 - ✔ A hardware block for cryptographic operation and key storage
 - ✔ General-purpose processor dedicated to the security sub-system
- Advantages
 - ✓ Cost reduction (compared to the external)
 - ✔ Performance improvement
- Disadvantages
 - ✔ Restricted perimeter (e.g. only for cryptography)
 - ✓ Less powerful than main processor
 - ✓ Time & energy consuming for inter-processor communication
 - ✔ Complex SoC design







TEE 하드웨어 아키텍처

Processor secure environment

- ARM TrustZone and Intel SGX
- Countermeasure for

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- Virus and malwares
- Low-budget hardware attack (e.g. Using a JTAG debugger)



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TEE System Architecture



Architectures with single TEE

- ARM TrustZone
- TI M-Shield
- Smart card
- Crypto co-processor
- TPM

Architectures with multiple TEEs

- Intel SGX
- TPM (and "Late Launch")
- Hypervisor

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Figure adapted from: Trusted Execution Environments on Mobile Devices. ACM CCS 2013 tutorial.



TEE Hardware Realizations

TEE component





Embedded Secure Element (smart card)

Internal

peripherals

ROM

Off-chip

Memory

Processor

core(s)

On-chip Security Subsystem

On-SoC

Processor Secure Environment (TrustZone, M-Shield)

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Figure adapted from: Trusted Execution Environments on Mobile Devices. ACM CCS 2013 tutorial.



(TPM, smart card)

Confidential Computing: AI Analytics on Private Data



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Confidential Computing: AI Analytics on Private Data







Privacy Issue in AI with Medical Data Processing



Gene editing backed by AI





AI needs lots of Private Data for Machine Learning



Patient Timeline



Medical Information & DNA Genome



Privacy Protection of Medical Data is Critical



FATCGCCCTGATTTGGGCTACATAACATAACATCACCACCAATGGGAGC CCGGTTATTTAACAAAAAAACGCGAAACCGATTTCCATAAATATGCCT AGTGGTTATACCCGGCTATCTGGTTGATGGCCTCCAGTTCGTAGTTAG



GGGTAGGTCACGATGTGGCGGTGGCAATGTTGTGGCGGCCATCCTGT



655,000 Healthcare Records Being Sold on Dark Web

(출처: https://threatpost.com/655000-healthcare-records-being-sold-on-dark-web/118933/)





Confidential Computing: AI Analytics on Private Data







Federated Learning: Sharing Private Medical Data

Federated Learning Architecture

Federated learning is a distributed machine learning approach that enables organizations to collaborate on machine learning projects without sharing sensitive data such as patient records.

KEY: 1 Local model sharing 2 Global model sharing updates



(intel)



https://mms.businesswire.com/media/20200511005132/en/790513/5/Intel-federated-learning-explainer.jpg

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Secure and Private AI in Federated Machine Learning



Schematic overview of the relationships and interactions between data, algorithms, actors and techniques in the field of secure and private AI.



출처: <u>https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-020-0186-1</u>



Confidential Computing: AI Analytics on Private Data







Self-Isolation Tracing App for Covid-19







Self-Isolation Tracing App for Covid-19



자가격리자 개인정보(자가격리 위치 등) 등록합니다. 위치 이탈 시 자가격리자 앱과 전담공무원 앱에 **알림**이 갑니다.







Contact Tracing Application for Android and IOS

What Apple and Google have proposed



When A and B meet, their phones exchange a key code



When A becomes infected, he updates his status in the app and gives his consent to share his key with the database



B's phone regularly downloads the database to check for matching codes. It alerts her that somebody she has been near has tested positive





Contact Tracing Apps in the World





Confidential Computing: AI Analytics on Private Data





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신뢰 컴퓨팅 (TEE) 적용 사례: AI 금융 보안

• 페이 열풍 시대





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• 페이를 사용하지 않는 이유



Source : 한국은행 '15.01, 전국 2500 가구 대상 조사 , 점수는 항목별 동의 정도에 대해 1~5점 부여 후 백분율로 환산







• 안전한 디바이스(TEE) 기반의 페이

온라인 서버 기반의 페이

디바이스(TEE) 기반의 페이





KNOX, TrustZone

Secure Enclave





신뢰 컴퓨팅 (TEE e.g., TrustZone)를 이용한 금융 보안



일반 실행 영역에서 동작하는 금융 앱

• 신뢰 컴퓨팅 실행환경에서 동작하는 금융 앱









- 물리적인 접근에 내한 방어보나는 SW 중심의 강력한 보안 기술이 더욱 절실
 새로운 암호 알고리즘을 적용하여 서비스 차별화 및 경쟁력 확보가 필요함
- B 물리적인 접근에 대한 방어보다는 SW 중심의 강력한 보안 기술이 더욱 절실해짐
- ョ 클라우드 환경이 확대됨에 따라 클라우드 환경에서 이용이 편리하여야 함
- 미 데이터량 및 디바이스의 빠른 증가로 대용량의 암호키 생성 및 처리가 매우 중요해짐





Digital (Crypto) Keys are an essential part of our digital lives

신뢰 컴퓨팅 (TEE) 적용 사례: 전자키 보호의 필요성

신뢰 컴퓨팅 (TEE) 적용 사례: 전자키 보호 관리

Scalable and Secure Digital Key Management with TEE



출처: <u>https://teeware.kr/</u>





Confidential Computing Consortium and TEE Companies





출처: <u>https://confidentialcomputing.io/</u>







Acknowledgements and Contacts: cysec.kaist.ac.kr

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- Kernel Integrity Monitors (Securing computing systems from the core: Kernel defense against insidious rootkit malware): <u>http://breakthroughs.kaist.ac.kr/?post_no=163</u>

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